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Compulsivity has been recently characterized as a manifestation of an imbalance between the
brain's goal-directed and habit-learning systems. Habits are perhaps the most fundamental
building block of animal learning, and it is therefore unsurprising that there are multiple ways
in which the development and execution of habits can be promoted/discouraged. Delineating
these neurocognitive routes may be critical to understanding if and how habits contribute to
the many faces of compulsivity observed across a range of psychiatric disorders. In this review,
we distinguish the contribution of excessive stimulus-response habit learning from that of
deficient goal-directed control over action and response inhibition, and discuss the role of
stress and anxiety as likely contributors to the transition from goal-directed action to habit. To
this end, behavioural, pharmacological, neurobiological and clinical evidence are synthesised
and a hypothesis is formulated to capture how habits fit into a model of compulsivity as a trans-
diagnostic psychiatric trait.
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When we perform an action with some regularity, the
associative links between cues in the environment and that
action (i.e. stimulus-response links) are strengthened, suchen access article under the CC BY license
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future (Dickinson, 1985). This processes is called habit
formation, and it allows us to automate behaviours that
do not require planning or organisation. From simple acts
like changing gears while driving, to ensembles of actions
such as making a series of left and right turns along a
familiar route, habits are in theory capable of controlling
almost every level of behavioural complexity. Because the
habit-learning system operates purely on the basis of
historical information, i.e. whether or not actions were
rewarded in the past (reinforcement learning: RL), in
isolation habit learning is not an optimal way to make
choices when faced with rapid changes in the environment.
Fortunately, our brains are equipped with a so-called ‘goal-
directed’ system that exerts control over habits in light of
new information, including changes in the desirability of
outcomes (e.g. not seeking food when satiated) and changes
to the contingency between actions and outcomes (e.g.
when we need to turn a key in the opposite direction to
what is typical to unlock a door). The balance between
these systems is susceptible to disruption by a range of
factors, of which several have been well characterized:
those include over-training (Adams, 1982), stress (Schwabe
and Wolf, 2009), associative learning conflict (de Wit et al.,
2009), working memory demands (Otto et al., 2013a), and
the correlation between actions and consequent outcomes
(Dickinson et al., 1983). A host of basic neuroscience studies
have been conducted in this area, converging on the notion
that the neural substrates of the goal-directed control
system are dissociable from that of the stimulus-response
habit system (Dolan and Dayan, 2013). Specifically evidence
from studies employing a range of techniques including
lesions (Corbit and Balleine, 2003; Yin et al., 2004; Faure
et al., 2005) and optogenetics (Gremel and Costa, 2013) in
rodents to functional (Valentin et al., 2007; de Wit et al.,
2009; Tricomi et al., 2009; Liljeholm et al., 2015) and
structural (de Wit et al., 2012b; Voon et al., 2015) imaging
in humans have converged on the importance of the caudate
nucleus (dorsomedial striatum in rodents; DMS) and medial
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) for goal-directed control over
action and the putamen for the gradual build-up of
stimulus-response habit links over time.
Habits have become a popular model of compulsivity in
the burgeoning field of dimensional psychiatry, in part
because of how relatively well characterized the supportive
processes are at the neurobiological level. Considered to be
a putative trans-diagnostic trait, maladaptive habits have
been proposed to play a role in a host of psychiatric
disorders including obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD)
(Graybiel and Rauch, 2000; Gillan and Robbins, 2014),
addiction (Everitt et al., 2001), eating disorders (Godier
and Park, 2014), schizophrenia (Morris et al., 2014), Tour-
ette's syndrome (Groenewegen et al., 2003), and social
anxiety disorder (Alvares et al., 2014). This article critically
evaluates the hypothesis that habits are a viable trans-
diagnostic model of compulsivity. This hypothesis, in our
opinion, rests on two assumptions. The first is that the link
between habits and compulsions should be generalisable,
i.e. be relevant for understanding multiple disorders that
are clinically characterized by compulsivity, which we
define broadly here as a loss of control over goal-directed
behaviour. Secondly, and of equal importance, is theassumption that that disruptions in habit learning should
be specific, i.e. irrelevant to disorders that are not clinically
characterized by compulsivity. In the course of this analysis,
we will dissect the possibility that excessive habit-learning,
although a common feature of many psychiatric disorders,
might arise from contributions of distinct neurocognitive
deficits. These putative multiple routes to a habit include
the contributions of stress, response inhibition and the
direct effects of repeated exposure to primary reinforcers
like food and drugs. Moreover, we will assess the extent to
which there is evidence that these ‘routes’ differentially
affect goal-directed (action-outcome: A-O) and habit (sti-
mulus-response: S-R) learning. Finally, we will discuss the
possible implications of these ideas for a future of indivi-
dually tailored treatment assignment.2. Excessive habits or deficient goal-directed
control in compulsivity?
The dominance of habitual associations may derive from the
incremental acquisition of stimulus-response links over
time, but can also be explained by a diminution of goal-
directed, action-outcome control over action. In other
words, habits (e.g. a lack of behavioural sensitivity to
devaluation, see Box 1) can manifest when stimulus-
response links become very strong, but also when there is
a reduction in our ability to exert control over habits-
processes that have dissociable neural substrates outlined
above. Behavioural output can perhaps thus be seen as
being governed by a mixture of, and even competition
amongst, the appropriate A-O and S-R representations. This
distinction may be critical to appropriately characterizing
certain neuropsychiatric disorders where there may be
(1) core deficits in goal-directed behaviour, (2) putatively
related deficits in top–down inhibitory control, (3) indirect
effects of stress on goal-directed learning and (4) direct
effects of exposure to primary reinforcers (i.e. food and
drugs) strengthening the stimulus-response associations
and/or compromising goal-directed control.
Probably the earliest disorder for which habit learning
was considered a viable model was drug addiction (Robbins
and Everitt, 1999; Gerdeman et al., 2003; Everitt and
Robbins, 2005; Hogarth et al., 2013). Specifically, the
development of compulsive drug-seeking was linked to a
transition to habit-based behaviour and a devolution of
control over such responding to the dorsolateral striatum
(DLS, posterior putamen in humans), that portion known to
be implicated in S-R learning (see Dolan and Dayan, 2013 for
review). Although different drugs of abuse vary in their
pharmacological mechanisms of action, and therefore have
differential direct effects on habit learning and goal-
directed control, here we focus on their shared rewarding
properties which, much like any primary reinforcer, stamp
in stimulus-response habitual associations over time. Con-
siderable indirect and direct evidence has since accrued to
support the view that drug use is particularly prone to habit-
forming: Zapata et al (2010) showed that cocaine-seeking in
rats in a two lever ‘seeking-taking’ schedule of administra-
tion became insensitive to devaluation of ‘taking’ after a
prolonged cocaine taking history. They were also able to
demonstrate that inactivation of the DLS reinstated
Box 1 Testing for habits
The dominance of habits over goal-directed associative links has traditionally been assessed using two methods,
which have each proved to be amenable to cross-species translation (Balleine and O'Doherty, 2010). The first, and
most widely cited, is outcome devaluation (first described by Adams (1980)), which assesses a key definitional
feature of goal-directed control: sensitivity of the response to motivational change. In a typical outcome
devaluation methodology, the value of the reinforcer of action is reduced (or, less typically, increased: Declercq and
De Houwer, 2008), and the experimenter assesses if the animal's behaviour appropriately updates in light of this
change. Value can be reduced in many ways, ranging from those affecting internal motivational state, i.e. selective
satiation (Tricomi et al., 2009) or taste aversion (Adams, 1980), to the external motivational value of outcomes in
the environment, i.e. removing threats (Gillan et al., 2014b) or changing the instructed value of an outcome (Gillan
et al., 2011). Another, lesser known, method for testing for habits is contingency degradation, which probes a
second definitional feature of goal-directed control-sensitivity of the response to the relationship between actions
and outcomes. Typically contingency degradation is achieved by presenting (previously response-contingent)
reinforcers in the absence of the response, and testing behavioural sensitivity to this change as above (Dickinson
and Balleine, 1994). Problematically, deficits in goal-directed control and enhancements of stimulus-response links
make the same prediction about behaviour in devaluation and contingency degradation tests, and as such are
limited in what they can tell us about putative mechanisms that support the development of compulsivity.
Functional neuroimaging can be helpful in this regard, allowing us to make inferences with respect to mechanisms
supporting devaluation sensitivity based on neurobiology of goal-directed actions and habits (Gillan et al., 2015a)
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that it again became goal-directed, a result consistent with
studies using ingestive reward (Yin et al., 2004; Balleine
et al., 2009). Corbit et al. (2012) similarly showed that
instrumental alcohol seeking in rats became insensitive to
devaluation after 4 weeks of training and also shown to be
mirrored by a shift in control from the dorsomedial striatum
(DMS) (a key region implicated in goal-directed control;
Dolan and Dayan, 2013) to the DLS. Finally, Dickinson et al.
(2002) compared alcohol to food rewards in an instrumental
learning paradigm and found that when alcohol reinforced
behaviour, it was less sensitive to devaluation (i.e. more
habitual) compared to when behaviour was reinforced with
food. This suggests that alcohol consumption may be
particularly susceptible to habit-formation.
Extrapolating the theory of goal-directed action con-
trol versus habit-based responding to human drug abusers
has been quite fruitful. One of the first examples is that of
Sjoerds et al. (2013) who provided behavioural and
neuroimaging evidence for over-reliance on habit learning
in alcohol-dependent patients. They used the so-called
‘Fabulous Fruit Game’ (de Wit et al., 2009), which
requires subjects to learn associations between stimuli,
actions and outcomes. After training, participants are
presented with two of these outcomes and asked to
perform the response that lead to the still valuable
outcome, thus probing their knowledge of action-
outcome associative learning during training. Abstinent
alcohol-dependent subjects underperformed compared to
healthy volunteers, indicating deficits in goal-directed
associative learning. Moreover, this lack of knowledge of
action-outcome links was accompanied by reduced activ-
ity of brain areas implicated in goal-directed action
(ventromedial prefrontal cortex/mOFC) and increased
engagement of those brain areas implicated in habit
learning (posterior putamen). In complementary work
utilising a computational analysis of goal-directed (so-
called ‘model-based’) learning (Daw et al., 2011, Box 2),
patients with stimulant dependence also showed deficitsin goal-directed control assayed using their trial-by-trial
decision-making behaviour (Voon et al., 2015). Finally,
Hogarth et al. (2012) investigated the acute effects of
alcohol consumption on devaluation sensitivity for food
rewards. Although the sample sizes were low in this study
and therefore warrant replication, the authors found that
participants who were administered alcohol showed less
sensitivity to devaluation compared to a placebo control
group, in spite of having intact knowledge of task
contingencies and a normal reduction of self-reported
desire for the reward following devaluation via selective
satiety.
In summary, there is convergence across studies in both
rodents and humans suggesting that the shift from associative
striatum (caudate nucleus) to sensorimotor striatum (posterior
putamen), from goals to habits, in drug abuse is likely driven
by simultaneous reductions in goal-directed control over
action and increases in habit associations that naturally occur
with continued reinforcement of drug seeking behaviour.
Finally, studies in rodents and humans support the notion that
aside from their general reinforcing properties, certain drugs
(e.g. alcohol) may also exert a compounding direct pharma-
cological effect on goal-directed control and/or habit forma-
tion (Dickinson et al., 2002; Hogarth et al., 2012).
A separate line of research has recently examined habit
learning in the context of an animal model of binge eating
disorder (Furlong et al., 2014). Rats were given access to
highly palatable condensed milk either continuously or for
restricted periods (which promotes bingeing behaviour)
before instrumental training for laboratory grain or sucrose
reward. Restricted access rats subsequently showed less
evidence of reward devaluation in their instrumental
responding, i.e. more habits. Interestingly, this correlated
with apparently greater changes in neuronal activity in the
DLS, consistent with greater control of behaviour by S-R
habits, rather than deficits in goal-directed control, which
we would expect to be mediated by DMS or prefrontal
changes. This result however, has not converged with a
study of human patients with binge-eating disorder (Voon
Box 2 ‘Model-based’ learning and goal-directed control
A recent computational framework was proposed which aimed to characterize the reinforcement learning
mechanisms that give rise to goal-directed actions and habits (Daw et al., 2011), they were termed ‘model-based’
and ‘model-free’, respectively. Model-free learning is a construct derived from basic temporal difference learning
(Sutton and Barto, 1998), the principle that actions which are rewarded in the past are more likely to be repeated in
the future – the so-called ‘law of effect’ (Thorndike, 1911). Because this kind of model-free learning is based
exclusively on prior experience, it is intuitive to suppose that variation in this quantity might predict how likely an
individual is to develop a habit. Model-based learning, in contrast, describes decisions that are not simply based on
which worked in the past, but instead uses a cognitive “map” of the world (Tolman, 1948) to make decisions
prospectively. This map is thought to contain information about contingency as well as the value of available
outcomes in the environment, which are integrated to arrive at an optimal decision. One obvious advantage of
utilizing the model-based system is that behaviour is sensitive to rapid changes in the environment – for example we
do not need to actually experience a change in how rewarding an action is following devaluation of the associated
reward, we can infer it and used this inference to make a better choice immediately. Critically, rather than relying
on a terminal devaluation test, this framework (and the associated tasks: Gläscher et al., 2010; Daw et al., 2011;
Lee et al., 2014) can be used to estimate the contribution of these learning modes from trial-by-trial learning and
thusly get more powerful estimates of variation in these putative cognitive processes.
The notion that model-based and model-free learning map onto goal-directed control and stimulus-response (S-R)
habit learning appropriately was assumed for some time, but was only recently tested. In three separate studies,
model-based learning during trial-by-trial choice was found to be predictive to devaluation sensitivity, of both those
same associations (Gillan et al., 2015b) and entirely different associations (Friedel et al., 2014). Model-free
learning, on the other hand, showed no relationship to devaluation sensitivity in any experiment suggesting that it
does not adequately track individual differences in the extent to which stimulus-response links build-up over time.
In summary, while model-based learning appears to be an appropriate (and powerful) mode of assessing individual
differences in goal-directed learning, model-free learning does not track habit formation in the same way. Future
work will be needed to refine and reformulate the computational mechanisms that support S-R learning.
831The role of habit in compulsivityet al., 2015). Although these patients show a similar deficit
in goal-directed (model-based) control to those described in
stimulant abusers above this deficit was associated with
changes in volume in the caudate (DMS) and medial
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) of Binge-Eating Disorder (BED)
patients, rather than the putamen (DLS). One explanation
for this apparent inconsistency is the important distinction
one must make between inducing BED-like behaviour in
otherwise healthy rats through over-exposure to palatable
foods, and studying patients who have a genetic propensity
for such behaviour (Javaras et al., 2008). One possibility is
that a genetic predisposition towards psychiatric compul-
sivity is primarily associated with structural and functional
abnormalities in goal-directed brain structures, whereas
environmental influences such as repeated exposure to
drugs and food may operate preferentially on habit-
structures like the putamen.
Finally, the largest body of work investing the role of habit
in human compulsivity has been conducted in obsessive–
compulsive disorder (OCD) (see Gillan and Robbins, 2014 for
review), triggered by the observed neurobiological overlaps
in terms of the neural substrates of habit formation and the
pathophysiology of OCD (Graybiel and Rauch, 2000; Burguière
et al., 2015). There are currently five studies in humans that
converge on the basic finding that OCD is associated with a
shift in balance away from goal-directed control and towards
habits, using different experimental paradigms and different
patient cohorts. This was first observed using the Fabulous
Fruit Game described above, where OCD patients exhibited
deficits in their ability to exert control over S-R behaviour in
light of the change in the value of outcomes (Gillan et al.,
2011). Next, this result was replicated in the avoidancedomain, where patients learned to press pedals to avoid
receiving unpleasant electric shocks to their wrists (Gillan
et al., 2014b). After training, one of their wrists was
disconnected from one of the electrical stimulation devices,
removing the threat of shock. Critically, this meant that one
of the predictive stimuli from training no longer signalled a
shock (i.e. the threat was devalued) and thereby rendered
that avoidance behaviour redundant. Once again, OCD
patients were more likely than controls to continue to
perform the response even though this action no longer
served a purpose. Importantly, this study established that
continued responding was not driven by any failures in task
comprehension or any residual (mistaken) beliefs about
threat on the part of OCD patients. In fact, there was some
suggestion that compulsive habits in OCD might even con-
tribute to the development of irrational fear (see Gillan and
Sahakian, 2015 for an elaboration).
Neither of these studies, however, could reveal if these
failures to show sensitivity to devaluation in OCD resulted
from deficits in goal-directed control or an excessive build-
up of S-R habits. Subsequent studies tackled this issue using
trial-by-trial decision-making experiments that did not
involve S-R repetition, and instead assessed subjects’ ability
to make choices that relied on an ability to predict the
likely outcomes of their actions (A-O) (Gillan et al., 2014a;
Voon et al., 2015). These studies used mathematical and
computational modelling, respectively, and together pro-
vided convergent evidence that suggested habit biases in
OCD could be explained by a selective deficit in A-O goal-
directed control over action. This supposition was further
tested using functional brain imaging of a large cohort of
OCD patients while performing a devaluation probe test
C.M. Gillan et al.832(Gillan et al., 2015a). Specifically, patients in this study
performed a modified version of the shock-avoidance para-
digm described above, and the authors probed if their
tendency to form habits was associated with dysfunction
in regions that support goal-directed control (caudate,
medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC)) or S-R learning (puta-
men). Habits in OCD were associated with dysfunctional
hyper-activity in the caudate and to some extent the mOFC,
but not the putamen (DLS). Moreover, the self-reported urge
to perform habits evident in OCD patients was parametri-
cally associated with the strength of activity in the caudate.
Although one cannot infer on the basis of a null effect that
excessive S-R links play no role in OCD, there was no
evidence in support of this notion. The finding that aberrant
caudate hyperactivity was associated with urges to perform
habits in our task adds weight to the suggestion that
excessive habits in this disorder are most likely a conse-
quence of failures in goal-directed control over action. This
notion converges with the broader suggestion that compul-
sivity as a trans-diagnostic trait may be characterized by
abnormalities in goal-directed structures and that this may
be separable from the (equally important) direct effects of
drug/food rewards on stimulus-response habit-learning in
the putamen.
However, it must be noted that a more precise neurobio-
logical characterisation of these deficits in OCD and related
disorders is needed. Although greater BOLD activity (as
observed in the imaging study above) in a given brain region
is often intuitively associated with improved performance,
we know that this is not the case for OCD. Rather, hyper-
activity in the caudate and mOFC are often induced by
symptom provocation in OCD (Rauch et al., 1994; Adler
et al., 2000; Mataix-Cols et al., 2003, 2004; Morgiève et al.,
2014) and this hyperactivity is remediated when treatments
are successful (Baxter et al., 1992; Swedo et al., 1992;
Schwartz et al., 1996; Nakatani et al., 2003; Le Jeune
et al., 2010; Zurowski et al., 2012; Figee et al., 2013;
Morgiève et al., 2014). So how exactly does hyperactivity
produce impaired performance – is this a predisposing factor
or a consequence of a lifetime with a compulsive disorder?
One way in which researchers have begun to answer this
question is through animal models of compulsivity, where
one can causally test the relationship between hyperactivity
in a given region and compulsive behaviours. Two such
studies were recently published using optogenetics in mouse
models of compulsivity. The first used a gene mutant model
where deletion of a gene (Sapap3) induces excessive
grooming behaviour alongside deficits in response inhibition
and increased firing of medium spiky neurons in the striatum
(Burguiere et al., 2013). Critically, the authors found that
they could restore behaviour to the normal range in these
mutant mice via compensatory optogenetic excitation of
the lateral OFC-striatal pathway, which down-regulated the
firing of these striatal neurons. In a complementary study,
another group simulated the well-documented hyperactivity
in the OFC-ventromedial striatal circuit seen in OCD using
chronic optogenetic stimulation. They found that a causal
relationship between this hyperactivity and the onset of
compulsive grooming behaviour in otherwise healthy mice.
Moreover, they found that both grooming behaviour and the
hyperactivity induced through chronic optogenetic stimula-
tion were remediated using a common treatment for OCD,the selective-serotonin reuptake inhibitor fluoxetine
(Ahmari et al., 2013).3. Response inhibition and habit
In the broadest possible terms, an impaired ability to
control behavioural responses is characteristic of both
impulsivity and compulsivity (Bari and Robbins, 2013).
Impulsive actions are those that are unplanned, prema-
turely expressed, involve risk and inappropriate to the
situation (Daruna and Barnes, 1993). Compulsive actions
on the other hand, are characterised primarily as the
(sometimes stereotyped) repetition of actions that do not
produce valuable outcomes. Although clearly distinguish-
able, a common feature across these constructs is that in
each case behaviour is uncontrolled, and carried out in spite
of adverse consequences. That is, whether the response is
premature or repetitively executed, both impulsivity and
compulsivity reflect a superficially similar lack of executive
control over action (Robbins et al., 2012). One possible
explanation for this overlap is that failures in response
inhibition might, under the right circumstances (perhaps by
interacting with other neurocognitive traits), produce both
impulsive and compulsive actions. Specifically, in the con-
text of compulsive disorders, failures of response inhibition
may contribute to patients' inability to exert control over
habitual responses. This tenet, which has not been hitherto
considered in detail, will be considered here. However we
include a caveat that the forthcoming evidence is largely
indirect.
Inhibitory performance has been typically assessed using
a range of neuropsychological paradigms including those
measuring motor response inhibition (e.g. Go/No Go task
probing action restraint and Stop Signal task probing action
cancellation) and cognitive inhibition (e.g. Stroop task,
Flanker task, and Simon task) (see van Velzen et al., 2014
for review). Response inhibition largely relies on a brain
network involving mainly right lateralized frontal brain
areas, such as inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and pre-
supplementary motor area (pre-SMA), projecting to the
motor cortex via the cortico-striatal-thalamic-cortical
(CSTC) connections (Chambers et al., 2009). Moreover, the
response inhibition networks rely on many neurotransmitter
systems, e.g., serotonin, dopamine, noradrenalin, gluta-
mate and GABA. Notably, deficits in inhibitory control have
been identified in many neuropsychiatric disorders within a
putative impulsive-compulsive spectrum, such as OCD and
trichotillomania (Chamberlain et al., 2006), ADHD (Rubia
et al., 2011) and addiction (Ersche et al., 2012). This evokes
the possibility that response inhibition may contribute to
patients’ inability to exert control over prepotent habits.
Studies on response inhibition in OCD showed that both
interference control and motor inhibition are impaired (van
Velzen et al., 2014). Impaired motor response inhibition is
also observed in unaffected first-degree relatives of OCD
patients (Chamberlain et al., 2007) suggesting that motor
response inhibition may be considered an endophenotype
for OCD. Also structural (Menzies et al., 2008) and
functional (de Wit et al., 2012c) brain correlates of altered
response inhibition are present in both OCD patients
and their unaffected siblings. Moreover, the reported
833The role of habit in compulsivitydysfunction of the inhibition-related network in OCD
patients and unaffected siblings seems to be explained, at
least partly, by altered connectivity between the IFG and
the amygdala (van Velzen et al., 2015) suggesting an
important role for the limbic circuit in inhibitory impair-
ment in OCD.
A recent study utilizing the Stroop paradigm in conjunc-
tion with a model-based learning task showed that indivi-
dual differences in cognitive control ability are correlated
with the extent to which individuals utilise goal-directed (A-
O) learning during decision making (Otto et al., 2014). This
suggests that cognitive control and goal-directed control are
related psychological constructs. Although it is reasonable
to speculate that failures to inhibit a prepotent response
might similarly contribute to one's ability to control an
inappropriate habitual response, a similar comparison of
motor inhibition and goal-directed learning is currently
lacking in the literature. Indirect evidence for a potential
contributory role for response inhibition in the expression of
habits in OCD comes from neuroimaging data in OCD,
suggesting that abnormal functional connectivity between
the rIFG and the mOFC during initial avoidance learning
predicts later habit formation in these patients (Gillan
et al., 2015a). Future studies should test for a relationship
between cognitive and motor inhibition, and goal-directed
control in the same patient cohort, and thus test if basic
inhibitory deficits can explain the variance in OCD patients’
goal-directed learning performance.
Alternatively, the answer might be even more straight-
forward. It is possible that the purported overlap in
response inhibition failures across impulsive and compulsive
disorders might simply be reflective of the evident flaws in
the current psychiatric diagnostic classification system
(Robbins et al., 2012; APA, 2013). Given that the assignment
of individuals to disorder categories is at best a noisy
process and at worst holds no biological relevance, there
has been a shift in neuroscience and mental health policy to
move towards using Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) when
possible (Insel et al., 2013). Another motivation for this
change is to improve novel drug development. For example,
the treatment of neurobiologically based specific symptoms,
such as impulsivity or compulsivity, is likely to be of greater
success than attempts to treat heterogeneous diagnostic
categories, such as schizophrenia and ADHD (Sahakian,
2014). In theory, an effective treatment for compulsivity
could be useful in multiple disorders that share this feature,
such as OCD, binge-eaters and drug addicted individuals
(Voon et al., 2015).4. Stress, anxiety and habit
Two apparent opposing theories have been postulated to
explain compulsivity in OCD. The classic cognitive-
behavioural theory of OCD posits that compulsive beha-
viour is caused by obsessive thoughts. It holds that
patients have the irrational belief that their intrusive
thoughts could be related to future harm to oneself or
others. Having these ideas causes significant distress,
which is ‘neutralised’ by performing compulsive actions
(Salkovskis, 1985). In a way, this theory implies that
compulsions are goal-directed, and in some sensefunctional, albeit driven by irrational thoughts. However,
as outlined in an earlier section, the relationship between
obsessions, compulsions and anxiety is now thought to be
quite different. Specifically, the recent habit hypothesis
of compulsivity posits that compulsive behaviour in OCD
results from a deficit in the control over goal-directed
actions, leading to increased reliance on habitual actions
(Gillan et al., 2011; Gillan and Robbins, 2014). In line with
this much more behavioural account of the disorder, OCD
has been recently removed from the anxiety disorders
section of the DSM, to its own category, ‘obsessive–
compulsive and related disorders’ (APA, 2013), reflecting
broad consensus that anxiety is not the defining feature of
OCD (Bartz and Hollander, 2006).
These opposing models may nonetheless be partially
reconciled by considering the influence of stress and anxiety
on habitual behaviour. Stress, distress and anxiety are often
used alongside or interchangeably. This may not be surpris-
ing given the general definition of stress as the nonspecific
response of the body to any demand (Selye, 1973), which
then also includes the bodily state that is often experienced
during anxiety. Clinical observations have long suggested
that stress exacerbates compulsive symptoms (Rachman,
1997) and stress also appears to predispose animals to
compulsive and inflexible behaviour (Korff and Harvey,
2006). Similarly, initial studies that have investigated the
influence of stress on habit behaviour found that a single
unavoidable stress procedure already shifts the use from a
spatial strategy towards a habitual strategy during a spatial
memory task (Kim et al., 2001). This effect appears to be
mediated by the neurotransmitter noradrenaline that is
released during stress (Packard and Wingard, 2004). Later
studies investigated the influence of stress on the relative
use of goal-directed and habitual systems using instrumen-
tal learning tasks and found that after acute as well as
prolonged stress, healthy humans show a marked lack of
sensitivity to devaluation (Schwabe and Wolf, 2009; Soares
et al., 2012). The effects of stress on promoting habitual
behaviour again appear mediated by stress hormones and
can be prevented by the administration of an adrenergic
receptor antagonist (Schwabe et al., 2010, 2011). Rodents
are also more likely to display habits after chronic stress,
which is associated with hypertrophy of the DLS and atrophy
of the prelimbic cortex and DMS (Dias-Ferreira et al., 2009).
Similar changes in brain structure occur after prolonged
stress in humans. Healthy individuals exposed to a period of
prolonged stress have larger putamen and smaller caudate
nucleus volumes and show opposite changes in orbitofrontal
cortex volume (Soares et al., 2012). Interestingly, the
prefrontal cortex is relatively sensitive to acute as well as
prolonged stress (Arnsten, 2009; Qin et al., 2009; van
Wingen et al., 2012) and changes in cortisol levels are
negatively related to goal-directed behaviour particularly in
individuals with lower prefrontal cortex capacities (i.e.
working memory) (Otto et al., 2013b). This suggests the
possibility that stress may primarily reduce prefrontal
cortex goal-directed control over behaviour and thereby
gives way for predominantly habitual behaviour, which over
time may result in neuroplastic changes elsewhere in
the brain.
Studies that have investigated the influence of acute
stress have also pointed to the role of the amygdala. This
C.M. Gillan et al.834brain region is crucial for the detection of salient events and
it initiates a cascade of psychological and physiological
states that are associated with stress and anxiety (Davis
and Whalen, 2001; Ulrich-Lai and Herman, 2009). Further-
more, recent human studies have shown that acute and
prolonged stress increase amygdala activity (van Marle
et al., 2009; van Wingen et al., 2011). Intra-amygdala
infusions of agonists for dopamine or noradrenaline, which
are released during stress (Arnsten, 2009), are sufficient to
bias behaviour towards the use of habit-like strategies in a
water-maze task (Packard et al., 1994; Packard and
Wingard, 2004). In addition, while the basolateral region
of the amygdala is known to be important for the acquisition
of goal-directed actions (Balleine, 2005) recent studies
show that the (central nucleus of the) amygdala is mainly
critical for the formation of habits by its interaction with
the DLS (Lingawi and Balleine, 2012). Together, these
studies suggest that high levels of stress (and possibly
anxiety) may initially shift goal-directed behaviour towards
habitual behaviour by both activating the amygdala and
reducing prefrontal cortex control over behaviour, and that
preferential habit behaviour may be maintained once
structural changes in the frontostriatal system have
occurred. However, this hypothesis is largely based on
experiments in rodents, and when the accruing evidence
from human studies is examined, quite a different picture
emerges. Although there is some evidence for basic deficit
in fear extinction recall in OCD (Milad et al., 2013), this is
related to aberrant vmPFC (not amygdala) activity, and in
fact fear learning and extinction proceed normally in OCD.
Direct investigations of structural and functional neural
correlates of goal-directed learning deficits in compulsive
disorders have yielded null effects with respect to amygdala
involvement, instead highlighting the importance of the
caudate and medial OFC (Voon et al., 2015; Gillan et al.,
2015a). The idea that compulsivity can be distinguished
from the role of fear conditioning in OCD and other
disorders at the nexus of compulsivity and anxiety (such
as hypochondriasis or body dysmorphic disorder) is further
supported by recent work showing that compulsive checking
tendencies in OCD that are unrelated to the extent to which
stimuli evoke anxiety (Clair et al., 2013). Moreover, in
contrast to a fear-based hypothesis of OCD, checking
behaviour in general becomes more automatised over time,
i.e. requiring less conscious effort (Dek et al., 2015).
Moving beyond the indirect evidence, a critical test of
the stress/anxiety hypothesis with respect to goal-directed
deficits in OCD is to assess purely anxious patients who do
not also suffer from other compulsive-disorders. One recent
study attempted to do this and found that patients with
social anxiety disorder have a greater tendency to form
habits compared to control subjects (Alvares et al., 2014),
providing support for a purported relationship between
anxiety and habit learning. However, these results must be
interpreted with caution as almost all of the patients tested
in this study met the criteria for another Axis I disorder, and
OCD symptom scores were not collected (and therefore
could not be used as a covariate). Therefore, we cannot
exclude the possibility that the presumably higher levels of
OCD severity in the social anxiety disorder patients
(Schneier et al., 1992) drove these effects. If this result is
replicable, however, it suggests that perhaps anxiety, whichin addition to compulsivity is an important clinical symptom
of OCD, may play a role in clinically relevant habit biases in
this disorder. This explanation could integrate the classical
cognitive-behavioural theory of OCD with the more recent
habit account for compulsive behaviour, however more work
is needed to directly test this possibility. Future work in
particular needs to address the pervasive problem of clinical
co-morbidity in psychiatric research. One promising
approach in the spirit of a more data-driven approach to
psychiatry (Montague et al., 2012; Brodersen et al., 2014) is
to conduct large-scale studies that can fully disentangle the
presumed dimensional contribution of variation in discrete
trans-diagnostic traits to habit-forming tendencies.5. How do habits fit with current treatment
models for compulsivity?
We will now discuss if habits as a model of compulsivity have
any explanatory power with respect to the efficacy of
different treatment strategies. We will largely focus our
discussion to OCD, as the relationship between habits and
compulsions in this disorder are the most comprehensively
characterized to-date. However, given the trans-diagnostic
framework advocated here, the implications are in theory
generalisable to the treatment of compulsions across many
disorders, including substance dependence and binge-eating
disorder.
The main pharmacological treatment for OCD are anti-
depressant drugs, including selective serotonin reuptake
inhibitors (SSRIs) (Fineberg et al., 2013). What is the SSRI
treatment doing in OCD? One possibility is that serotonergic
treatment is reducing rumination and/or anxiety symptoms
in patients and thereby indirectly exerting an improvement
in OCD symptoms by improving obsessions and anxiety
symptoms and thereby indirectly affecting the need to
perform compulsions. For example, since high stress induces
a tendency to form habits excessively (as discussed earlier)
(Schwabe and Wolf, 2009), if the SSRIs are reducing the
effects of stress, then the drug may be able to help switch
the OCD patient from habitual behaviour towards goal
directed behaviour. Along these lines, Faulkner and Deakin
(2014) have concluded that the dorsal raphé nucleus
projections to the peri-aqueductal grey matter (PAG)
restrain panic and escape in anticipation of threat in
animals. Robinson et al. (2012), Cools et al. (2008) and
Crockett et al. (2009) have all emphasised the effects of
serotonin on learning from punishment, but also its impact
on reward and resilience. Extending this to OCD, it may be
that SSRI treatment is restraining high anxiety levels and
reducing the effects of punishment (Morein-Zamir et al.,
2013), thereby enhancing the opportunity to benefit from
therapies, including exposure treatment aimed at extin-
guishing maladaptive compulsive habits and irrational fears.
This explanation fits with the cognitive theory of OCD
described briefly above (Salkovskis, 1985), but suffers from
a couple of problems. First, SSRIs are generally prescribed in
OCD at much higher doses than is the typically recom-
mended dose for SSRI use in depression and anxiety
disorders (Bloch et al., 2010). Second, if the therapeutic
effect of OCD is through anxiety reduction, then one would
expect benzodiazepines to have a positive effect in OCD,
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Hollander, 2006).
Another explanation for the therapeutic effect of SSRIs in
OCD is based on evidence suggesting that SSRIs are working
predominantly in the OFC in OCD patients (el Mansari et al.,
1995; El Mansari and Blier, 2006). The OFC, in particular the
medial portion, is involved in goal-directed control over
action in healthy people (Valentin et al., 2007; de Wit et al.,
2009). This region is among the most consistently implicated
in OCD (Whiteside et al., 2004), is hyperactive during
instrumental learning in these patients (Gillan et al.,
2015a), and shows overlapping functional connectivity
abnormalities to those seen in addicted individuals at rest
(Meunier et al., 2012). In line with the suggestion that
serotonergic medication remediates goad-directed deficits
in OCD, a recent study has shown that acute typtophan
depletion, which reduces serotonin transmission, induces a
shift from goal-directed to habitual control over action
using the ‘Fabulous Fruit Task’ (Worbe et al., 2015b), and
similarly has a deleterious effect of model-based learning
(Worbe et al., 2015a). Similar results have been found for
reversal learning, which is a task in which a left press might
signal food for a series of trials, whereas a right press will
not signal any reinforcement. Following a series of success-
ful trials, the contingencies are reversed and the rate of
continued responding to the previously rewarded stimulus is
measured (perseverance). In marmosets, impairments in
reversal learning can be induced by lesions to the OFC (Dias
et al., 1996) and the medial striatum (Clarke et al., 2008)
and selective 5-HT depletion in the OFC (Clarke et al.,
2005). These findings align with recent data examining the
impact of SSRIs in OCD found that instrumental learning
under both reward and punishment conditions were
enhanced in patients receiving SSRI treatment relative to
those who were unmedicated (Palminteri et al., 2012),
although note this was a convenience sample not a
double-blind controlled trial.
Antidepressant treatment in OCD is sometimes augmen-
ted by antipsychotic drugs (Denys et al., 2004). Antipsycho-
tics block dopamine receptors and their action as an add-on
to antidepressant treatment could be as a major tranquili-
ser, in an attempt to block stereotyped and ritualised
behaviour, or to dampen down the habit system. These
latter two possibilities are likely related. For example,
antipsychotics are used in the treatment of autism for
stereotyped or self-injurious behaviour. The efficacy of
antipsychotic medication in treating psychotic symptoms
in schizophrenia is directly related to antagonistic effects of
these drugs on D2 receptors in the striatum. The role of
dopamine in compulsive habits has been compounded by
studies in rodents; habits that were induced through the
rodent model of binge-eating described earlier (Furlong
et al., 2014) were eliminated (i.e. goal-directed behaviour
was restored) after either dopamine D1 receptor antagon-
ism or an AMPA antagonist infused intra-DLS. This is
consistent with previous findings of a role for nigrostriatal
dopamine in habit formation in the rat (Faure et al., 2005)
and that a regime of amphetamine sensitization (which
presumably enhances striatal dopaminergic function)
enhances the shift to habits (Nelson and Killcross, 2006).
Basic research in humans has produced findings that do not
align neatly with studies in rodents, however. For example,a natural link to extending these findings to human neu-
ropsychiatric disorders would concern Parkinson's Disease
(PD), which might predict a major deficit in S-R habit
learning as a consequence of the preferential depletion of
dopamine in the dorsal striatum; however, one attempt to
test this found results that indicated it was goal-directed
learning that appeared to be impaired in patients with this
neurodegenerative disease (Nelson and Killcross, 2006; de
Wit et al., 2011). Moreover, model-based learning is in fact
enhanced by increasing dopamine levels following levodopa
administration (Wunderlich et al., 2012), and is associated
with higher levels of presynaptic ventral striatal dopamine
(Deserno et al., 2015). Similarly, acute tyrosine (dopamine
precursor) depletion impairs goal-directed control on the
fabulous fruit task (de Wit et al., 2012a). These inconsis-
tencies may stem from dopamine's inverted U-shaped
effects on working memory and cognitive control (Cools
and D'Esposito, 2011; van Velzen et al., 2014), perhaps
interacting in a confounded manner with the general lack of
specificity of these designs, i.e. that both Parkinsonism and
systemic levodopa administration are non-specific with
respect to action within striatal subregions, e.g. in the
former case, dopamine depletion is observed in both the
caudate and putamen (Bernheimer et al., 1973). In addi-
tion, the issue is further complicated when one considers
that impairments in dorsal versus ventral circuits in PD
depend on medication status and disease stage (Vriend
et al., 2014).
The final treatment we will consider in the context of
habit learning in compulsive disorders is Exposure and
Response Prevention (ERP) (Meyer, 1966), which works
best when used in conjunction with SSRIs in OCD (Foa
et al., 2005). In ERP, the patient undergoes (i) symptom
provocation via exposure to relevant stimuli or situations
and (ii) must resist the urge to perform the compulsive
act. This treatment does not only produce a reduction in
compulsive responding, but also concurrently causes the
urge to respond and obsessive thoughts to dissipate (Foa
and Goldstein, 1978). So, for example, if the OCD patient
had repetitive thoughts about contamination and compul-
sively hand-washed, the patient would be exposed to dirt
or requested to put their hands in toilet water and then
prevented from immediately washing their hands. One
way in which the efficacy of this treatment for OCD can be
explained is as a systematic breaking down of S-R asso-
ciative links through repeated response prevention exer-
cises. Hyperactivity in the caudate, which has been linked
to deficits in goal-directed behaviour in OCD (Gillan
et al., 2015a) is remediated when patients respond to
ERP (Baxter et al., 1992), adding neurobiological support
to this suggestion. Moreover, in OCD, studies have shown
that habits induced in the laboratory are closely tied to
subjective urges to respond (Gillan et al., 2014b, 2015a),
mirroring the observed concurrent decline in urge and
compulsion observed during ERP. Perhaps relatedly, absti-
nence in addiction, which also breaks habitual associa-
tions between cues and drug-taking behaviour, reliably
results in a reduction in craving in these patients
(Weddington et al., 1990; McClernon et al., 2005). How-
ever, the major problem with both ERP and abstinence is
that these therapeutic strategies are not tolerated well
by patients.
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mechanisms for disrupting putative S-R links that are deeply
entrenched by the time patients typically present for
treatment (Sahakian et al., 2010; Insel and Sahakian,
2012). There can be no doubt that S-R links are strength-
ened with repetition (Adams, 1982; Tricomi et al., 2009), so
regardless of whether excessive S-R or deficit A-O learning is
the primary cause of compulsivity, OCD and addictions
become more difficult to treat with time. In the early
stages of the disorder, cognitive behavioural treatments and
pharmacological treatments may prove more effective, but
patients will have to use these treatments to learn and
relearn adaptive behaviours and effective strategies for
reducing and eliminating symptoms in future. That is, early
intervention studies will require that patients take an active
role in their treatment throughout the lifespan (Sahakian,
2014). Early detection and early treatment to reduce stress-
induced biasing of the habit system should improve func-
tional outcome, quality of life and wellbeing in patients
suffering from disorders of compulsivity, particular that
presents with concomitant anxiety. Ideally, this would be
combined with treatments that strengthen goal-directed
behaviour and top–down cognitive control strategies for
controlling urges. Early detection in childhood, adolescents
and young adulthood is crucial. New treatments with novel
mechanisms of action are required for the treatment of
compulsive disorders. These treatments should be aimed at
research domain criteria (RDoC), rather than diagnostic
categories (Insel et al., 2013), in order to more effectively
link biology to symptomatology.6. Summary and conclusions: Generalisability
and specificity
Deficits in goal-directed control and associated over-
reliance on habits is a model of compulsivity that demon-
strates impressive generalisability across psychiatric diag-
noses that have features of clinical compulsions, including
OCD, addiction and binge-eating disorder (Voon et al.,
2015). One question raised by this generalisability is how
can we explain why particular habits become crystallised in
certain individuals? If these compulsive problems are caused
by a common underlying trait, why are some individuals
compulsive about food but not drugs, and others by washing
their hands but not checking the door? An important point to
consider here is that the notion that compulsivity is a
quantifiable trans-diagnostic trait relevant for many disor-
ders is not the same as saying that these disorders (or
indeed all OCD patients) are entirely the same. Individuals
diagnosed with different disorders may have many over-
lapping symptoms, but by their very definition, they have
distinguishable clinical phenotypes. These phenotypic dif-
ferences may be caused via interactions with other putative
trans-diagnostic traits such as anxiety, or by external
environmental influences (e.g. exposure to food or drugs).
Defining these factors and assessing their diagnostic utility is
an important question for future research – while relevant
trans-diagnostic traits may be highly relevant in terms of
differential treatments for OCD versus addiction for exam-
ple, whereas distinctions between the particular content of
compulsions in OCD may be of lesser importance.Although generalisability is important, of equal interpre-
tive importance, studies attesting to the specificity of this
effect to disorders of compulsivity are presently in short
supply. One likely explanation for this is the pervasive
difficulty associated with publishing null results in science.
Notwithstanding, two studies examining goal-directed
learning in disorders not typically defined as compulsive,
social anxiety disorder (Alvares et al., 2014) and schizo-
phrenia (Morris et al., 2014) have also identified deficits in
goal-directed control over action, which raises concerns for
considering habits a viable a model of compulsivity. There
are some alternative explanations for these effects. Firstly,
in the respective studies, either co-morbid disorders were
not excluded for (Alvares et al., 2014), or patients none-
theless had greater levels of anxiety, depression and stress
compared to controls (Morris et al., 2014). Moreover, OCD
symptom severity was not measured in either study, and
could therefore have explained the results, particularly as
higher rates of OCD have been consistently reported in
schizophrenia (Poyurovsky and Koran, 2005) (note schizo-
phrenia is not more prevalent in the OCD population), and
social anxiety disorder (Schneier et al., 1992). Future
studies are needed to directly assess the issues of specificity
and expand on what we know about generalisability (e.g. to
other disorders of compulsivity e.g. trichotillomania). Until
then, we are left with the disconcerting possibility that
goal-directed deficits are ubiquitous in all psychiatric
populations. If this is the case, then this model will likely
not have predictive power with respect to tailoring treat-
ments on an individual basis.
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